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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the influence of user participation on 
accounting information system performance with top management support, task 
complexity, system complexity, user skill as moderating variable and the effect of 
accounting information system performance on individual performance. The population 
in this study are employees on good banking company bank Persero or BUSN Devisa 
listed in Bank Indonesia totaling 39 banks including bank persero 4 and 35 BUSN Devisa. 
Total Bank to be sampled are 8 banks and total of respondent are 100 respondents. Using 
the Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) and Moderate-Structural Equation Modelling. 
The results show that user participation influence significantly on AIS performance. Top 
management support, task complexity, system complexity, user skill moderates the effect 
of user participation on AIS performance. And AIS performance influence significantly on 
individual performance 
 
Keywords:  Infromation Asymmetry, Size, Return on Asset, Capital Adequacy Ratio, Loan 
to Deposit Ratio, Earning Management. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The existence of information 
asymmetry is considered as a cause of 
earnings management. Richardson (1998) 
argues that there is a systematic rela-
tionship between the degree of infor-
mation asymmetry earnings management. 
The existence of information asymmetry 
will encourage managers to present 
information that is not true , especially if 
the information relates to the mea-
surement of the performance of the mana-
ger. Flexibility for managing earnings 
management can be reduced by providing 
more quality information to outside 
parties. The quality of the financial 
statements will reflect the level of 
earnings management . 
Some researchers have found that 
information asymmetry can affect 
earnings management. Agency theory 
implies the existence of information 
asymmetry between managers as agents 
and owners (in this case is a shareholder) 
as principal. Information asymmetry 
arises when the manager is better 
informed on the company's internal and 
prospects for the future than the 
shareholders and other stakeholders. If 
associated with an increase in the value of 
the company, when there is asymmetric 
information, managers can provide a 
signal about the state of the company to 
investors in order to memaksimisasi 
company's stock value. Given signal can 
be done through disclosure (disclosure) of 
accounting information.The big size 
company has a large stakeholder base, so 
that the policies of large enterprises will 
have greater impact on the public interest 
than small companies. For investors, the 
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company's policy will have implications 
on cash flow outlook for the future. As 
for the regulator (government) will have 
an impact on the amount of taxes to be 
received, as well as the effectiveness of 
the role of giving protection to the 
general public. 
Profitability (earnings) of banks in 
this study was assessed by the ratio 
Return on Assets (ROA). According 
Dendawijaya (2005:118), this ratio is 
used to measure the ability of bank 
management in the overall gain. The 
larger the ROA, the greater the level of 
profit achieved the better the bank and the 
bank's position in terms of the use of the 
asset. Profitability is often used to 
measure the efficiency of the use of 
capital in a company by comparing 
income with capital employed in 
operations, therefore a great advantage 
does not guarantee or is not a measure 
that rentable company. Management or 
other parties generally assess higher 
profitability is more important than big 
profits, so the manager is expect to 
perform earnings management to increase 
rentability. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Time dimension of this research 
involves a lot of time (time series) with 
many companies (cross section), so that 
hypothesis testing is done by means of the 
pooled data. Data collection methods used 
were archival data collection (archival). 
These types of companies studied were 
banking companies listed on the Stock 
Exchange in the year 2007-2012. The 
variables examined in this study include: 
asymmetry of information with the bid-
ask spread as proxy, size of the company 
with total assets as proxy, return on assets 
(ROA), Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR), 
Loan to Deposit Ratio (LDR), and 
earnings management with discretionary 
accruals as proxy. The population is all 
public banking company in Indonesia in 
2007 until 2012. Sampling was done by 
using purposive sampling method, a 
purposive sampling also commonly called 
as judgmental sample.  
The population in this study are 
banking companies listed on the 
stock exchange by using the 
reference period 2007-2012, that 
banking companies must be go public 
from 2007 until the end of 2012, 
which amounted to 36 companies. 
Companies that do not have a 
complete financial statements in the 
period 2007-2012 is 4 companies. A 
total of 15 companies that do not 
have a complete list of stock prices, 
including the 4 companies that do not 
possess the full financial report 
period 2007-2012. Total 21 
companies sampled in this study. 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
 
Testing of hypothesis performed 
with Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) 
using the software SPSS Version 18. 
Limit of significance (p) which is used in 
decision making admissibility hypothesis 
that is equal to 0,05 or 5%. In another 
words, hypothesis will be accepted if the 
significance value (p) obtained less than 
or equal to 0,05 or 5% (p ≤ 5%) (Hair et 
al., 1998; Sekaran, 2000; Nur'Ainy, 2010). 
In testing the normality testing of 
the data has been described to cope the 
residuals variable distribution is not 
normal (total assets), the transformation 
of data into the form of  the  natural  
logarithm (ln) (Ghozali, 2005), so after 
the change the research model change 
becomes: 
DACC = α + β1ADJSPREADi + β2 
LnTAi + β3 ROAi + β4 CARi + β5 LDRi 
The results of the first and second  
hypothesis testing can be seen in Table 1  
below:
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Table 1. Hypothesis test 
 
Coefficientsa 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
B 
Standardized 
Coefficients  
t Sig. Std. Error Beta  
1 (Constant) .042 .113  .333 .045 
ADJSPREAD .018 .002 .049 .482 .031 
Ln_TA .089 .000 .474 3.815 .035 
ROA -.073 .019 -.041 -.357 .092 
CAR .062 .005 .098 1.162 .074 
LDR -.011 .001 -.092 -1.101 .027 
a. Dependent Variable: DA 
Source : SPSS data processed (2013) 
 
 
Table 1 shows the positive signi-
ficant effect of information asymmetry on 
earnings management practices with t 
count 0.482 with a significance level of 
0.031 point which is less than 0.05, this 
means that the first hypothesis is accepted. 
Positive coefficient indicates that the 
higher information asymmetry, oppor-
tunities of the manager to perform 
earnings management  become higher 
either. 
Independent variables size have 
positive significant effect on the earnings 
management. Size has t count of 3,815 
with a significance level of 0.035, which 
is less than 0,05, this means that the 
proposed second hypothesis acceptted.   
ROA variable did not affect earning 
managent significantly. ROA significance 
level is 0,092 which is higher than 0,05, 
with t value of -0,35. 
CAR variable did not affect earning  
managent significantly with significance 
level 0,074 and t value 1,162. 
LDR variable have negative signi-
ficant effect earning management with 
significance level 0,027 and t value -
1,101. 
Adjusted R square value is 0.237  
(appendix). This means that all inde-
pendent variables asymmetry information, 
size, ROA, CAR, LDR can explain the 
dependent variable earnings management 
by 23.7 percent, while the remaining 76.3 
percent is explained by other variables 
not included in the model. 
Based on the analysis results the 
regression model is: 
DA = 0,042 + 0,018 ADJSPREAD + 
0,089 LnTA – 0,073 ROA + 0,062 CAR 
– 0.011 LDR 
Information asymmetry coefficient 
(ADJSPREAD) of 0.018 means that if 
earning management rise with the 
assumption that the other variables 
constant, the asymmetry information will 
rise 0,018. While the regression 
coefficient of size is fixed at 0.089 means 
that if management earnings rose by 
assuming other variables rconstant , then 
the size of the company will rise 0,089. 
ROA coefficient of -0,073 means that if 
earning management rise with the 
assumption that the other variables 
constant, the asymmetry information will 
down by 0,073 point. CAR coefficient of 
-0,062 means that if earning management 
rise with the assumption that the other 
variables constant, the asymmetry 
information will rise by 0,062 point. LDR 
coefficient of -0,011 means that if earning 
management rise with the assumption that 
the other variables constant, the 
asymmetry information will down by 
0,011 point. 
 
Discussion 
Effect of Asymmetry Information on 
Earning Management  
The results of hypothesis testing 
showed that the positive significant effect 
of information asymmetry on earnings 
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management practices with a t value of 
3.815 with a significance level of 0.035. 
The results of this test support the results 
of research conducted by Rahmawati, et 
al. (2006), Halim, et al. (2005) and 
Richardson (1998) which showed that the 
effect of information asymmetry on 
earnings management practices. Rahma-
wati, et al. (2006) examine the effect of 
information asymmetry on earnings 
management. Rahmawati, et al. (2006) 
using the 120 observations with five years 
of research that is conducted in the years 
2000-2004 and banking companies listed 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI). 
Information asymmetry measured 
using the relative bid-ask spreads and 
earnings management is measured by 
using the Modified Jones Model. Data 
analysis techniques used are simple re-
gression. The results of the study proved 
that the independent variables are positive 
influence of information asymmetry 
significantly and is able to explain the 
dependent variable earnings management. 
 Halim, et al. (2005) examine the 
effect of information asymmetry on 
earnings management. Halim, et al. (2005) 
using the 34 companies listed on the 
Jakarta Stock Exchange and including the 
LQ-45 index in 2001 for 2 consecutive 
periods (the period of February 2001 and 
August 2001) and in 2002 for 2 
consecutive periods (the period of 
February 2002 and August 2002). 
Richardson (1998) examined the 
relationship of information asymmetry 
and earnings management in all com-
panies listed on the NYSE late June 
during the period 1988-1992. The results 
of his research that there is a systematic 
relationship between the level of infor-
mation asymmetry and earnings mana-
gement.  
The impact of the financial crisis is 
clearly visible on the rupiah weakened 
against the U.S. dollar in 2008. Due to the 
outflow of foreign capital as a result of 
excessive panic on global financial crisis. 
The impact would be similar also happens 
to inflation (detiknews.com, 2008).  De-
parting from 1997 crisis experience, when 
the global crisis hit the United States and 
European countries, the Government and 
the Bank proactively take precautionary 
action. Some banking regulations being  
loosened in order to avoid the collapse of 
the financial and banking system. 
(okezone.com/economy, 2010). Descrip-
tive statistics show that the average 
discretionary accruals for banking com-
panies amounted to 0,072 and the value is 
positive. From 2008 banking crisis factor 
this indicates that in period 2007-2012 
Indonesian banking sector doing earnings 
management because of their missions to 
maximize profit pattern.  
From the result of  hypothesis test 
suggests that the positive effect of infor-
mation asymmetry on earnings mana-
gement. This suggests that the higher 
information asymmetry  the opportunities 
for the manager to perform earning 
management become higher. Information 
asymmetry occurs because the manager is 
better informed than the other companies 
(owners or shareholders). 
 
Effect of Firm Size on the Earning 
Management  
The results of hypothesis testing 
showed that the positive significant effect 
of firm size on earnings management.This 
is because the size of the company has 
tcount of 3,815 with a significance level 
of 0.035. The results of these tests is 
different from the research conducted by 
Moses (1997), Marrakchi (2001), 
Veronica and Siddhartha (2005), and 
Rahmawati, et al. (2006). Their results 
showed that size variable has negative 
effect on earnings management . The 
results of this study also not support the 
research conducted by Marihot and 
Doddy (2007), Salno and Baridwan 
(2000), Jatiningrum (2000), as well as 
Nasser and Herlina (2003), who found 
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that company size has no effect on 
earnings management practices. 
The positive coefficient indicates 
the bigger the company, the greater 
chance the manager to perform earnings 
management. Big companies have more 
complex operational activities and big 
companies are also required to face hig-
her  investor expectations.(Moses 1997). 
The results of hypothesis test show that 
size have positive effect on earnings 
management, this result is clearly 
different from many previous result 
which mostly told that size have negative 
effect on earning management. The 
government and Bank Indonesia's 
response to the impact of the 2008 by 
regulating tight money policy. Since 
January 2009, Bank Indonesia began 
reducing interest rates. With interest rates 
down will increase consumption and 
investment so that aggregate output will 
rise, but this policy will lead to reduceing 
of investor will due to interest rates 
decrease. The performance of recovery of 
the banking policy was also carried out in 
the crisis period in 2008 (kompas, 2010). 
This could be factor for big size company 
also doing earning management in period 
2007-2012, they tend to increase their 
earning to attract investors after global 
crisis in 2008. Based on result H2 is 
rejected. 
 
Effect of ROA on the Earning 
Management  
Return on Assets ( ROA ) has t 
value of -0.357  with significant value of 
0.092, so that the ROA not effect on 
earnings management significantly in 
corporate banking . ROA is financial 
ratios to measure the ability of bank 
management to gain ( profit ) as a whole . 
The larger the ROA of a bank , the 
greater the level of profit that the bank 
achieved and the better the position of the 
stretcher banks in terms of asset utili-
zation (Dendawijaya, 2001:120 ). Minis-
try of the State Secretariat of the Republic 
of Indonesia (2009 ) revealed that banks 
tend to set high interest to minimize bad 
debts. Banking more into account this 
advantage because then no reserve assets 
which can be used to overcome the 
problem of bad credit. When interest rates 
rise, both interest income and interest 
expense will rise. 
The negative result of this test is 
match with research from Healy (1985) 
The owner of the company establishes a 
certain number as the lower limit (boogey) 
and upper limit (cap) to obtain the bonus. 
Manager will obtain a bonus if they 
manage corporate profits above the lower 
limit, otherwise the manager will not 
receive a bonus if the company's earnings 
do not reach the lower limit. The upper 
limit is needed to determine the maxi-
mum profit that will be used as the basis 
for calculating the bonus. That is, the 
manager will only get a bonus for the 
profits that are above the upper limit and 
lower, while the excess is not taken into 
account as a bonus counters. A lot in 
2007-2012 applied  that lower limit 
regulation bonus rules, therefore in 2007-
2012, the manager tend to not doing 
earning management when the ROA is 
already catch the lower limit bonus value.  
Based from that so the H3 is rejected. 
 
Effect of CAR on the Earning 
Management  
Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) has 
t value of  1,162 with significant value of 
0.074, so that the CAR did not affect 
earnings management signifcantly in 
corporate banking. This result is match 
with the research done by Novita senja 
(2011) because the role of corporate 
governance in the banking company has 
executed well, giving rise to the 
conclusion that the provisions of the 
minimum obligations CAR thresholds set 
by Bank Indonesia does not affect 
discretionary accruals. Corporate Gover-
nance has been stipulated in Bank 
Indonesia Regulation Number 8/4/PBI/ 
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2006 On the Implementation of Good 
Corporate Governance for Banks. This 
research was carried out after 2006, so the 
possibility of earnings management can 
be minimized by the application of this 
rule.  
This result is different with research 
done by Dendiwijaya (2005) CAR is the 
ratio of a bank's performance to measure 
the adequacy of a bank's capital to 
support assets that contain or produce risk. 
CAR is an indicator of the ability of the 
bank to cover the decrease in assets as a 
result of losses caused by a bank's risky 
assets. Profits made by the bank's 
management has intensified with the 
direction reversed to the level of CAR, 
where the bank has a value lower than the 
CAR of Bank Indonesia's minimum 
requirement tends to be more intensive 
practice of earnings management and vice 
versa. This is logically accepted because 
in 2005 good corporate governance not 
being implemented yet, then after 2009 
GCG have been implementing until now. 
Based from the result so the H4 is 
rejected. 
 
Effect of LDR on the Earning 
Management  
Loan to Deposit Ratio (LDR) has t 
value of -1.101  with significant value of 
0.027, so that the LDR have negative 
significant effect on earnings mana-
gement in corporate banking. This result 
is shows the ability of banks in 
channeling funds from collected third 
party. Consideration received from a 
lending income for the bank, otherwise 
bank shall issue a third party in return for 
the funds that are costs to the bank. The 
lower the value of LDR which also 
showed lower bank earnings, it will 
motivate banks to make profits by 
increasing earnings management (Zahara 
and Sylvia, 2009). Aryati and Manao 
(2000) in Setiawati (2010), found that 
there is LDR differences between healthy 
banks and ailing banks. The research 
done by Arnawa  (2006 ) in Zahara and 
Sylvia (2009) also showed that LDR 
negatively affect earnings management. 
Based from the result so the H5 is 
accepted. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusion 
Based on the formulation of the 
problem, research objectives, theoretical 
basis, hypothesis, and the results of 
research conducted, it can be concluded 
as follows: 
1. Asymmetry information  have posi-
tive significant effect on banking 
sector’s earnings management in 
2007-2012. The results of this tests 
support the research conducted by 
Rahmawati, et al. (2006), Halim, et 
al. (2005) and Richardson (1998) 
which showed that the effect of 
information asymmetry on earnings 
management practices. This suggests 
that the higher the higher the 
information asymmetry opportunities 
of the manager to perform earnings 
management practices. Thus the first 
hypothesis in this study accepted. 
2. Firm size has positive significant 
effect on earnings management 
practices. There are two views about 
the shape of the relationship of firm 
size on earnings management 
practices is the first view which 
states that firm size has a positive 
relationship with earnings manage-
ment practices as conducted by 
Halim, et al. (2005),  Moses (1997), 
Albretch and Richardson (1990). The 
second view which states that the 
size of the company has a negative 
relationship with earnings manage-
ment as practiced by Marrakchi 
(2001) and Veronica and Siddhartha 
(2005). Thus the results in this 
research of baning sector in 2007-
2012 support the view that firm size 
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has a positive significant relationship 
with earnings management, Big 
companies have more complex ope-
rational activities and big companies 
are also required to face higher  
investor expectations (Moses 1997). 
Therefore the second hypothesis in 
this study rejected.  
3. ROA did not affect banking sector’s 
earnings management significantly in 
2007-2012. This result is different 
from the result of research conducted 
by Dechow and Sloan (1991), 
Defond and Jiambalvo (1994), and 
Yulianti (2005). They found that 
manager tend to do earning mana-
gement because of bonus motivation. 
The negative result of this test is 
match with research from Healy 
(1985) The owner of the company 
establishes a certain number as the 
lower limit (boogey) and upper limit 
(cap) to obtain the bonus. Manager 
will obtain a bonus if they manage 
corporate profits above the lower 
limit, the manager will only get a 
bonus for the profits that are above 
the upper limit and lower, while the 
excess is not taken into account as a 
bonus counters. Banking companies 
applied  that lower limit regulation 
bonus rules, therefore in 2007-2012, 
the manager tend to not doing 
earning management when the ROA 
is already catch the lower limit bonus 
value.  Based from that so the H3 is 
rejected. 
4. CAR did not affect earnings mana-
gement significantly in corporate 
banking. This result is match with the 
research done by Novita senja (2011) 
because the role of corporate 
governance in the banking company 
has executed well, giving rise to the 
conclusion that the provisions of the 
minimum obligations CAR thres-
holds set by Bank Indonesia does not 
affect discretionary accruals. Corpo-
rate Governance has been stipulated 
in Bank Indonesia Regulation Num-
ber 8/4/PBI/2006 On the Imple-
mentation of Good Corporate Gover-
nance for Banks. This research was 
carried out after 2006, so the 
possibility of earnings management 
can be minimized by the application 
of this rule. This is logically accepted 
because in 2005 good corporate 
governance not being implemented 
yet, then after 2009 GCG have been 
implementing until now Based from 
the result H4 is rejected.  
5. LDR have negative significant effect 
on earnings management in corporate 
banking. The lower the value of LDR 
which also showed lower bank 
earnings, it will motivate banks to 
make profits by increasing earnings 
management (Zahara and Sylvia, 
2009). Aryati and Manao (2000) in 
Setiawati (2010), found that there is 
LDR differences between healthy 
banks and ailing banks. The research 
done by Arnawa  (2006 ) in Zahara 
and Sylvia(2009) also showed that 
LDR negatively affect earnings 
management. Based from the result 
so the H5 is accepted. 
 
Recommendations 
 
This research has some limitations : 
1. This research only uses banking 
companies for the sample so the 
results of this study cannot be gene-
ralized to other types of companies. 
For the next research can use other 
sectors such as manufacturing, trans-
portation or telecommunications. 
2. This research only  used 22 
companies for  samples, it means this 
research not fully represent the state 
of the banking company in Indonesia. 
Future research should use more 
sample or use all the population for 
the research data. 
This study only examines the effect 
of information asymmetry, firm size, 
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ROA, CAR, and LDR variables on 
earnings management, there are so 
many other variables that affect the 
earning management practices. Fu-
ture research may use a proxy other 
than the total assets to measure firm 
size as the total sales to determine 
differences in the results obtained by 
using different proxy or use other 
variables such as corporate gover-
nance. 
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